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ABSTRACT
The launch of Amazon’s e-Marketplace to co-locate primary (sale of new books) and secondary (resale of used books)
markets has disrupted the serenity of the book markets and invited enormous debate over the survivability of the primary
market sellers. Grounded on information economics and decision under uncertainty, this study takes a different perspective
by arguing that whether Amazon’s market aggregation initiation will adversely affect new booksellers depends on whether
the consumers perceived the quality of both new and used books to be symmetrically uncertain or asymmetrically uncertain.
The research further explores the possibility of how the reputation feedback mechanism could be beneficial to the new
booksellers.
KEYWORDS
Online book competition, market aggregation, consumer choice.
 INTRODUCTION
“Is Amazon becoming the Napster of the book business?”
- New York Times, July 12, 2004
“For now, the effect of used trade book sales on new trade titles is unclear”
- Publisher Weekly, September 27, 2004
The primary and secondary markets have co-existed in harmony for years. On the one hand, these two markets serve different
customer segments that have differing preferences for quality and price. On the other hand, the secondary market has always
been selling used books at a low profile. Exemplary, the trading of used books has been confined in both the offline and
online contexts, to musty stores, flea markets, fund-raising events and consumer-to-consumer auction websites such as eBay
and Yahoo!Auction. Hence, secondary market does not directly threaten the primary market to the extent of affecting the
profitability from the sales of new books significantly. However, the launch of Amazon e-Marketplace to list old copies of
current and popular books alongside with Amazon’s new titles in November 2000 has disrupted the serenity of the book
markets and invited enormous debate over the survivability of the primary market sellers.
Amazon’s high profile dissemination of used books has brought the secondhand books to the attention of book readers like
never before (Streitfeld, 2000). Amazon adds links that present much cheaper used books to the same pages that highlight the
more expensive new copies, inducing shoppers to purchase used books. This is coupled with the fact that these used books
are often offered for sale at the same time as the books’ original publication or a few days later, without giving the novel a
chance to become generally available. In this vein, the co-location of the used and new books could possibly cause the used
books to cannibalize the sales of old books. Since neither the authors benefit from the royalty fees nor the publishers receive
any profit from the sales of used books, the market aggregation initiative could reduce the author’s incentives to write and
publishers’ incentives print books (Ghose, Telang, and Krishnan, 2003). Even though there is no concrete evidence indicating
cannibalization of sales, market analysts are concerned that the fundamental principle of publishing economics (i.e. the
royalty framework) has been disturbed (Tirole, 1988). A few percentage points of lost new book sales to online sales of used
books are already critical to a slow-growing publishing industry. Furthermore, some authors may take pride in their works
and perceive that their books should worth more under any circumstances; hence seeing their books being traded at such a
low price may inflict ‘emotional wounds’ on the authors.
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However, Amazon holds a somewhat different viewpoint by suggesting that market aggregation would in fact bring about a
win-win  situation  for  all  three  parties,  namely  Amazon,  consumers  and authors  in  two ways.  First,  by  offering  owners  an
outlet to dispose used books that still have market value and have been derived of utility (Ghose et al., 2003), it gives them a
budget to buy more new books (i.e., translating to higher overall market demand for new books). Second, given the
inefficiency of the book distribution system and the rapidity in which books become unavailable, the market aggregation
would allow many authors to have a chance of being discovered. From this perspective, although there is no direct profit to
the  author  when a  copy of  his  book is  resold,  there  is  considerable  indirect  profit.  A reader  who reads  and admires  one’s
books  in  a  second  hand  copy  becomes  a  potential  reader  or  even  buyer  of  one’s  next  book,  and  serves  to  be  a  sales
representative for that particular author through recommendations to other readers. In this sense, the market aggregation may
not be a bad idea after all.
To the best of our knowledge, extant studies have not adequately addressed the business and economic impact of market
aggregation. One notable exception is the study by Ghose et al. (2003) that includes a game-theoretical model to examine the
interactions between sellers and consumers. Deducing from the model, the authors conclude that the presence of the
secondary  market  provides  an  avenue  for  consumers  to  liquidate  their  second-hand  books,  which  in  turn  increases  the
consumers’ disposable incomes to acquire additional new books. Still, the study has failed to provide sufficient evidence to
reason why the consumers would prefer to acquire new books rather than the old books while the various sellers within these
two markets are intensively evaluated against each other. In this light, our objective is to explicate the conditions under which
the  new  or  old  books  are  more  likely  or  less  likely  to  be  chosen  by  the  consumers  in  the  online  context  from  a  buyer’s
perspective. Specifically, we examine the issue of market aggregation from the perspective of information provision by
seeking to answer the following research question: How do consumers compare between new and used book offers and make
purchase decisions online?
PRICE, QUALITY AND VALUE
The principles of the cost-benefit analyses have been exemplified in the concept of value, which broadly defines the trade-off
between total benefits received and total sacrifices, reflected in the trade-off between effort to be expended on information
acquisition and accuracy of the decision. Earlier interpretations of benefit and cost components centered on perceived quality
and monetary price. In the current context, the quality refers to the quality of the books purchased which is indicated by
seller’s product classification and the feedback information (e.g., feedback rating and feedback comments), while price refers
to the actual price paid for the book acquired over the Internet. Building on the trade-off notion, the current research draws
upon the choice under uncertainty literature (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000) and information economics (Kirmani et al.
2000), to assess consumer choice by simulating the environment in which decision-making occurs. Specifically, we contend
that the economic impact of the market aggregation exerted by Amazon may depend on two aspects of information provision:
what is known (information asymmetry between sellers and consumers) and what is provided (information cues to be
provided to consumers, particularly through reputation feedback mechanism).
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND CONSUMER CHOICE
Traditional perspectives on the effects of information, such as advertising, have focused on the information acquisition,
integration and retrieval processes in consumer judgment and choice (Payne and Bettman, 1999). Increasingly, researchers
have attempted to integrate information economics into the traditional behavioral perspective and this integration of
theoretical views has touted to yield more insightful observations. The information economics approach is based on the
premise that different parties in a transaction often have different amounts of information regarding the transaction, and this
information asymmetry has implications for the terms of the transaction and the relationship between the traded parties
(Kirmani and Rao, 2000). In online markets, where products (e.g., books listed for sell in Amazon) are not physically
available for inspection (Shaked and Sutton, 1982) and product information needs to be experienced, information asymmetry
exists. Specifically, in the current context of information acquisition and processing to make a choice among different
product options provided by different sellers, it is assumed that consumers would evaluate each option based on its desired
attributes according to which various sellers can be differentiated into certain parties involving in the aggregated online
market. Limited information about the product or service normally results in two possible outcomes: Adverse Selection and
Risk Aversion.
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Figure 1. Information Asymmetry between Buyer and Sellers
In the first scenario (Figure 1), sellers have perfect information while consumers have limited information. This may result in
market failure or the sale of relatively low quality goods (i.e., the used books) only if the market somehow manages to
survive in the first place (Akerlof, 1970). In the current context, the product quality is indicated through the seller-defined
classification as new or used book while more detailed quality condition may be addressed according to Amazon defined
categories (e.g., like new or acceptable for used books).and the seller-provided product descriptions. Therefore, consumers
are less likely to be able to estimate the quality of products with a certain level of confidence, partly due to the lack of
physical goods inspection via the Internet and it remains unknown if the sellers are capable of providing such quality
products. Reflected in the Amazon.com setting, for example, in the new book category, the description of some books may be
unclear (e.g., a nice clean paperback copy with no marks to text) which may make the buyer confused to estimate the true
quality of the new book provided, although it has been classified as new book. On the other hand, the similar situation may
happen in the used book category as well, e.g., the like new or acceptable quality condition for some used books is quite
vague as the actual standard to measure acceptable is unknown for the buyer but only known by the seller himself/herself.
However, consumers are generally concerned about the quality of the product, for e.g., whether the book will be delivered
and in good readable condition as the seller describes. In this situation, consumers could only base their decision on another
product attribute, i.e. price, to mitigate the potential loss resulted from relatively weak quality estimation under information
asymmetry. For that reason, consumers are driven towards the purchase of lower-priced products, usually the used books,
which in turn leads to lower incentive for sellers to sell high-quality products with high production cost (e.g., the new
booksellers or publishers). Ultimately the high-quality sellers exit the market, leaving the “lemons” behind (Tirole, 1988).
These low-quality inefficiencies may be attributed to an externality in which sellers (more precisely, the publishers) fail to
completely capture the benefits of selling high-quality products (Akerlof, 1970). In this sense, when consumers base their
decision solely on the product price offered by different sellers, it appears that the new booksellers are at a more disadvantage
than used booksellers in market aggregation are since they often sell the books at a higher price. Consumers may also find it
difficult to evaluate the products offered in terms of their quality, as the information is often unavailable. In this way,
consumers find it hard to differentiate new booksellers’ product offers from that of the used book competitors. Thus, the
average willingness for the consumer to fork out more money for new books decreases accordingly. Hence, we propose:
Proposition 1: Consumer is more likely to choose a lower price book (mostly represented as used book) than higher price
book (mostly represented as new book) when the quality of both new and used books cannot be ascertained.
The second scenario (Figure 2) pertains to a choice between an option of reasonably quality certainty (new book) and an
option of quality uncertainty (used book), instead of between new and used books under pure information asymmetry
condition. This is because compared to the used booksellers, the new booksellers are mainly dominated by the publishers and
distributors, who have higher brand establishments1, and hence, consumers are believed to perceive new booksellers to be
more trustworthy (i.e., higher level of perceived product quality and quality certainty) (Pavlou and Gefen, 2004).
Theoretically,  this  form  of  decision  refers  to  risky  choice  under  the  broad  umbrella  of  prospect  theory  (Kahneman  and
Tversky, 2000).
1 Based on antidotal evidence, Amazon has more stringent criteria and evaluation criteria to for a seller to be qualified as new booksellers.
Hence, very often, these new booksellers are publishers or distributors who have regular business dealings with Amazon.
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Figure 2. Information Asymmetry between Buyer and Selected Sellers
One emblematic experiment on risky choice involves a choice between a prospect that offers an 85% chance to win 1000
(with a chance to win nothing) and the alternative of receiving $800 for sure. The experimental results indicate that a large
majority of people prefer the sure thing over the gamble, although the gamble has higher (mathematical) expectation
(Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). It shows that the prospect of gaining something for sure will be relatively more attractive
than gaining something with uncertainty while the perceived optimal outcome in uncertain condition will be slightly better
than that of certain condition, known as risk aversion. The situation is similar as the aggregated book market purchasing
decision making in order to gain the product entity differentiated by its quality, while the new book with certain good quality
has relatively higher price than the used book with uncertain quality level. This observation can be better explained by
referencing the regret theory. According to the theory, a decision-maker is aware that he will feel regretful if he makes a
wrong choice (Bell, 1982) and hence, he will then take into account this anticipated regret when deciding. Research has
shown that a consumer would more likely to choose the sure thing, that is risk averse (e.g., purchase new books), when they
expect that they will not learn the outcome of the choice as in the case of book purchase (Loomes and Sugden, 1987). When
consumers are confronted with a choice between a more certain option (i.e., purchase new books) and a risky option (i.e.,
purchase used books), the outcome of a certain option (i.e., purchase new books) is, by definition, known in advance. But
choosing the risky option implies that you will always know what outcomes the certain (new book) option entails, which is
the source of future regret if the risky option fails to fulfill the expectation. From another perspective, it is also undeniable
that  the  risky  option  carries  some regret  on  its  own if  one  chooses  the  certain  option.  Hence,  the  choice  of  the  options  is
confounded with feedback on foregone outcomes. Specifically, choosing the certain option prevents feedback on what might
have  been,  whereas  the  risk  option  provides  this  information,  and thus  carries  the  risk  of  regret.  In  order  to  minimize  the
anticipated regret, a consumer will be more likely to exhibit risk aversion during decision-making by choosing the certain
(i.e., new book) option. In addition, the price gap between new book with certainly good quality and used book with
uncertain quality is not large, sometimes even very small.  Hence, guided by the risk aversion theorem, a large majority of
consumers will more likely choose to pay a price premium to guarantee the quality of product they will achieve rather than
taking the risk of compromising quality fulfillment just in order to save a small amount of money, especially suitable for the
book purchasing case, namely the ascertained quality can outweigh a lower price. Regardless of the price dimension, this
propensity for certain quality will become even more significant. Hence, we propose:
Proposition 2: A consumer is more likely to choose the new book when the quality of the new book is relatively more certain
than that of the used book.
REPUTATION FEEDBACK MECHANISM
As discussed, information asymmetry feature of the electronic market may carry additional risks associated with fraudulent
transaction under potential incomplete or distorted information provided by the seller. This problem is amplified in the online
shopping context, where information on product quality is often obscured/misrepresented; thereby increasing consumers’
perception on choice uncertainty, likewise the situation in the aggregated primary-secondary e-Marketplace, such as Amazon.
Further, to strengthen market performance especially when consumers are uncertain over the quality of both new and used
books,  the  sellers’ identities  are  made known to  consumers  prior  to  purchases.  Indeed,  it  is  often  observed that  there  is  a
tendency for sellers to “deceive” consumers on the Internet (Grazioli and Wang, 2001) as the quality can only be ascertained
after consumption and when the sellers (particularly those used booksellers) focus on short term rather than long-term
profitability (Milgrom, North, and Weingast, 1990). However, when the sellers’ identity recognition is perceived as important
to fulfill their engagement in a long term relationship with online consumers, these sellers would be more willing to build up
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their reputations and less willing to sell inferior products (Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, and Lockwood, 2002). Thus, the
online consumers’ perception towards sellers’ reliability can correspondingly be enhanced, as well as the seller-provided
offers.
One increasingly common implementation is the inclusion of institutional mechanisms (such as the online feedback rating
mechanism hosted by Amazon in this particular study) that serve as an informal buyer-driven certification system for sellers’
reputation (Pavlou and Gefen, 2004). The feedback rating mechanism possesses the ability to enhance buyers’ calculus-based
credibility trust towards the other transacting party (Ba and Pavlou, 2002). In the Amazon setting, it consists of a feedback
rating score and certain number of feedback comments based on which the rating score is generated, while the higher score
approaching 5.0 indicates higher reputation level based on previous selling history. Moreover, the feedback comment is
distinguished between positive and negative one, while the negative dimension is the main concern in current study because
it is believed the negative comments possess much greater impact on consumers’ evaluation on the seller’s reputation. The
dimensions composing feedback rating and comment rely on the seller’s honesty through the trading, the fulfillment of
promised conditions, the actual quality received, the service efficiency, etc. Based on the established trust among potential
parties (i.e. buyers with new booksellers) in the electronic market, buyers’ uncertainty perception over the product sold by
certain sellers may accordingly be alleviated, including the product quality, services provided by the sellers, etc. With the
involvement of feedback rating mechanism, the probability of repeated transaction is based on consumers’ information about
the  past  behavior  of  all  available  sellers  (Ba  and  Pavlou,  2002).  To  get  as  high  feedback  rating  (i.e.,  the  rating  score)  as
possible, rational sellers would behave in a trustworthy manner rather than dishonest or opportunistic way to avoid
consumers’ possible sanctions, which results in potentially high opportunity cost for the outcome of cheating (Ba and Pavlou,
2002). Hence, according to game theory (Milgrom et al. 1990), high feedback rating can transfer the trust from consumers to
consumers namely will sufficiently lead potential consumers to trust the sellers, which further helps reduce consumers’
perceived transaction risk (i.e. quality uncertainty). Consequently, consumers are more willing to compensate the group of
reputable sellers with certain price premiums (Rao and Monroe, 1996).
In relation to our context, one could have contended that used booksellers could leverage on the feedback mechanism to
reduce the consumers’ propensity to purchase new books given the precondition of low-price attribute of used books.
However, empirical evidence indicates that the impact of high feedback ratings could vary depending on whether the
products sold are new or used. Particularly, Kalyanam and McIntyre (2001) suggest that high feedback rating helps increase
the product prices significantly only for new products than those of the older ones. This is because according to the
deception, trust and risk (DTR) model (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa, 2000), when rational and serious consumers encounter with
much higher feedback ratings for secondary market sellers offering used books with much lower price than those primary
market sellers, consumers be suspicious over the potential deception existence on the feedback comments. Furthermore, the
high feedback ratings add additional credibility for the new product in primary market whose quality is more likely to be
certain beforehand, while such effect becomes weaker for used product in secondary market with possible much more quality
uncertainty and fluctuation. Consequently, the significantly differentiated assurances based on high feedback ratings (e.g., 4.8
or above in a 5-star mechanism) over the new and used items determine that consumers are more likely choose to purchase
the new books even with a higher price premium than those of used ones (Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001). Hence, we
propose:
Proposition 3: High feedback rating will increase the propensity of purchasing new books higher than that of the used books.
Subsequently, we also need to look at the impact of negative feedback comments contained as the other determinant for the
feedback rating score on the online shoppers’ purchasing decision. Assuming that sellers have yet to establish trust from the
consumers, the existence of negative feedback comments is very likely to impair consumers’ perception of seller reputation
(Ba and Pavlou, 2002), which is even more likely to supersede the effect of high feedback rating score (Resnick et al. 2002).
Evidently, Lee, Im and Lee (2000) highlight that negative feedback comment has higher detrimental effect on the consumer
choice for used products or products that are perceived to be riskier. This is because product quality from secondary market
sellers is usually perceived to be inferior when compared to those from the primary market sellers (Smith and Brynjolfsson,
2001). Conceptually, as depicted in Figure 3 below, value of seller’s reputation function is based on the deviation from the
reference point namely the highest feedback rating (i.e., 5 stars) for sellers and it is generally concave for new book seller and
convex for old-book seller. These two conditions concur with the economic principle that marginal value decrease of seller’s
reputation is steeper with the decrease of feedback rating which is resulted from incrase of negative feedback comments for
used booksellers than that of new booksellers (Tirole, 1988). Consequently, the perceived reputation of used bookseller is
harmed more by the increase of buyers’ negative feedback comments that of new bookseller. Hence, even given the same
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feedback rating results, as long as the negatives are available, consumers will be likely to form poorer reputation impression
of the secondary market sellers and hence, deduce a lower anticipated product quality satisfaction, which indirectly sway
consumers to the new book purchases. Following this argument, we propose:
Proposition 4: Negative feedback comments will decrease the propensity of purchasing used books higher than that of the
new books.
Figure 3. Value Function of Seller’s Reputation over the Feedback Rating
FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION
Grounded on information economics (Kirmani and Rao, 2000) and decision under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky,
2000), this study argues that whether Amazon’s market aggregation initiation will adversely affect new booksellers depends
on whether the consumers perceived the quality of both new and used books to be symmetrically uncertain or asymmetrically
uncertain. The research further explores the possibility of how the reputation feedback mechanism could be beneficial to the
new booksellers. Several theoretical contributions and managerial implications can be derived.
From a theoretical standpoint, this study goes beyond the extant literature that has paid particular attention to how the
primary e-Marketplace sellers could benefit from the significant reduction in search cost (e.g., Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001)
to qualify the influence of e-Marketplace aggregation initiation on consumer decision-making. Our literature review and
deductions starkly challenge the implicit assumption that at the expense of the primary market sellers, consumers shopping
online are likely to benefit from wider variety of alternative choices, and secondary market sellers are likely to benefit from a
direct price contrast with the new offers. In fact, our findings provide compelling propositions suggesting that the primary
market sellers may benefit more from the market aggregation by incorporating the substantial uneven information asymmetry
effect and the disproportional influence of reputation identification mechanism over the two e-Marketplace segments. In this
sense, this study extends our current state of knowledge in online consumer decision-making behavior by examining the
impact of market aggregation and how primary market sellers could “defense” their fortress or “benefit” from the initiation.
From a practical standpoint, this study offers valuable advice to the new booksellers, as well as the electronic intermediaries
(e.g., Amazon). For the new booksellers, this study allows them to make an informed decision on whether they should
participate in the aggregated e-Marketplace like Amazon and how they could better leverage their participation by
considerately facilitating consumers’ reach to inductive information. Because of a concern that new books sales may be
cannibalized by the penetration of used book market, merchants have generally expressed intention to refrain from
participating in Amazon. However, we believe that primary market sellers should not view the Amazon’s initiation as a
catalyst of market competition, but rather, depending on how the consumers differentiated between new and used books, they
should view Amazon as a place where certain favorable marketing strategies can be derived and pursued. For example, new
booksellers could leverage on the reputation feedback mechanism to strengthen their brand establishments and induce the
consumers to (continue) purchase their products. Intermediaries could apply our propositions to assuage primary market
sellers’ anxiety that the market aggregation will lower their value of value of branding and reduce their profit margins. To the
extent that the value of the book market aggregation is determined by the number and variety of participating sellers,
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intermediaries, such as Amazon, could emphasize the advantages demonstrated in this study in their marketing campaign to
attract more new booksellers.
As this study is still at a preliminary stage, the discussion of research methodology (i.e., future research) is relatively
epigrammatic. Nonetheless, we believe that the two propositions can be assessed in two ways in a laboratory experiment. The
first way is to use a between-subjects design, where the participants are randomly assigned to any one of the groups, namely
the control group (i.e., all used or all new books) and new and used book treatment group. Each participant will be asked to
shop for a book. To increase the incentives for the participants to focus on the task seriously, the participants will be told that
the specific item will be converted to cash depending on the real book quality. After the task completion, the participants will
answer questions that are intended to measure their thinking process. The second way to test the model is a within-subject
design where each participant is asked to purchase products under conditions of all new books; all used books and mixture of
new and old books. The order in which the purchase is to be conducted will be randomly determined. Each participant will
have to purchase different book title for different treatment to minimize learning effect. The incentive mechanisms and data
collection procedures will be the same as described for the between-subjects design.
In conclusion, gaining a better understanding of the impact of market aggregation and applying the appropriate strategies,
new booksellers could leverage or exploit the market aggregation initiation to satisfy the consumers’ urge to compare and yet
increase their returns at the same time.
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